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Abstract
In this PhD thesis in Applied Mathematics, Dynamical Systems and Game Theory are
applied to Biomedical Sciences and Economical Sciences. The subject of Immunology
is covered in the models with Regulatory T cells and the Patent Licensing is studied
in a Cournot competition framework.
Asymmetry in Immune response models with Regulatory T cells: We analyse
a model of immune response by T cells (CD4), where regulatory T cells (Tregs) act
by inhibiting IL-2 secretion. We study an asymmetry reflecting that the difference
between the growth and death rates can be higher for the active T cells and the active
Tregs than for the inactive T cells and inactive Tregs. We present explicit formulas,
both approximate and exact, that give the concentration of T cells as a function of the
concentration of Tregs and explicit formulas that relate the antigenic stimulation of T
cells, the concentration of T cells and the concentration of Tregs. The relation between
the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the concentration of T cells is an hysteresis
that is unfolded when some of the parameters are changed. We also consider a linear
tuning between the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the antigenic stimulation of
Tregs. In this case, we also have obtained explicit formulas, both approximate and
exact, relating the antigenic stimulation of T cells, the concentration of T cells and the
concentration of Tregs. With these, we can explain the appearance of an isola and a
transcritical bifurcation.
Strategic optimization in R&D Investment: We use d’Aspremont and Jacque-
min’s strategic optimal R&D investment in a duopoly Cournot competition model to
construct myopic optimal discrete and continuous R&D dynamics. We show that for
some high initial production costs, the success or failure of a firm is very sensitive to
small variations in its initial R&D investment strategies.
Keywords: Equilibria, hysteresis, bifurcation, ODE model, immunology, T cells,
Tregs, secretion inhibition, asymmetry, death rates, strategic R&D, Cournot duopoly
model, patents.
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Resumo
Nesta tese de Doutoramento em Matema´tica Aplicada, aplicam-se Sistemas Dinaˆmicos
e Teoria de Jogos a`s Cieˆncias Biome´dicas e a`s Cieˆncias Econo´micas. No aˆmbito da
Imunologia sa˜o estudados modelos com ce´lulas T reguladoras e o Licenciamento de
Patentes e´ estudado numa competic¸a˜o de Cournot.
Modelos assime´tricos de resposta imunita´ria com ce´lulas T Reguladoras: E´
analisado um modelo de resposta imunita´ria por ce´lulas T (CD4), no qual as ce´lulas
T reguladoras (Tregs) atuam inibindo a secrec¸a˜o de IL-2. E´ estudada uma assimetria
que reflete que a diferenc¸a entre a taxa de proliferac¸a˜o e de mortalidade pode ser
maior para as ce´lulas T ativas e Tregs ativas do que para as ce´lulas T inativas e Tregs
inativas. Apresentam-se fo´rmulas expl´ıcitas, aproximadas e exatas, que permitem obter
a concentrac¸a˜o de ce´lulas T em func¸a˜o da concentrac¸a˜o de Tregs e fo´rmulas expl´ıcitas
que relacionam o est´ımulo antige´nico de ce´lulas T a concentrac¸a˜o de ce´lulas T e a
concentrac¸a˜o de Tregs. A relac¸a˜o entre o est´ımulo antige´nico de ce´lulas T e a concen-
trac¸a˜o de ce´lulas T e´ uma histerese que se desdobra quando alguns dos paraˆmetros
sa˜o alterados. Tambe´m se considerou uma relac¸a˜o linear entre o est´ımulo antige´nico
das ce´lulas T e o est´ımulo antige´nico das Tregs. Tambe´m neste caso se obtiveram
fo´rmulas expl´ıcitas, aproximadas e exatas, relacionando o est´ımulo antige´nico de ce´lulas
T a concentrac¸a˜o de ce´lulas T e a concentrac¸a˜o de Tregs. Estas permitem explicar o
surgimento de uma ilha e uma bifurcac¸a˜o transcr´ıtica.
Otimizac¸a˜o estrate´gica em investimentos em I&D: Usa-se a otimizac¸a˜o es-
trate´gica em investimentos em I&D de d’Aspremont e Jacquemin num modelo de
competic¸a˜o de Cournot em duopo´lio para construir dinaˆmica discreta e cont´ınua de
o´timos mı´opes em I&D. Mostra-se que para custos iniciais elevados, o sucesso ou o
fracasso de uma das empresas e´ muito sens´ıvel a pequenas variac¸o˜es na estrate´gia
inicial de investimento em I&D.
Palavras chave: Equil´ıbrios, histerese, bifurcac¸a˜o, modelo com equac¸o˜es diferenciais
ordina´rias, imunologia, ce´lulas T, ce´lulas T reguladoras, inibic¸a˜o da secrec¸a˜o, assime-
tria, taxas de mortalidade, I&D estrate´gico, modelo de duopo´lio de Cournot, patentes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is the result of two different investigation projects I have been involved
with. During my PhD in Applied Mathematics I was able to develop my knowledge
in Dynamical Systems and Game Theory. These Mathematical concepts were applied
to two distinct areas of knowledge that I knew little in the beginning of my PhD (and
I still have much to learn about them): the Biomedical Sciences and the Economical
Sciences.
In Chapter 2 we study a model of immune response by T cells, with the presence of
Tregs presented in Burroughs et al. (2006) and further studied in Burroughs et al. (2008,
2011a,b,c,d) and surveyed in Pinto et al. (2010). In particular, we analyse here the
asymmetry introduced in Burroughs et al. (2011b). In this model, cytokine dependent
growth exhibits a quorum T cell population threshold that determines if immune
responses develop on activation, Burroughs et al. (2006, 2008). Secretion inhibition by
Tregs manipulates the growth dynamics and effectively increases the quorum threshold,
Burroughs et al. (2006, 2008), i.e. to develop immune responses a higher number of
T cells need to be activated. Thus Treg induced secretion inhibition can provide a
mechanism for tissue specific regulation of the balance between suppression (control)
and immune responses, a balance that can be varied at the local tissue level through
the regulation of the local active Treg population size in order to protect the tissues
against autoimmunity, Burroughs et al. (2008, 2011a,b,c,d); Pinto et al. (2010). The
asymmetry is modeled by considering that the secreting T cells have a lower death
rate than the non secreting T cells and that the active Tregs also have a lower death
rate than the inactive Tregs, thus mimicking the effect of the memory T cells. With
this asymmetry, the antigenic stimulation of the Tregs is able to control locally the
population size of Tregs, and that there is an improvement of the efficiency of the
immune responses, Pinto et al. (2010); Burroughs et al. (2011a,b,c,d). The results
presented in Chapter 2 are contained in our papers Figueiredo et al. (2014); Oliveira
13
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 14
et al. (2014a,b,c). We have obtained an explicit formula that gives the approximate
concentration of Tregs as a function of the concentration of T cells and the parameter
values, and another explicit formula that gives approximately the antigenic stimulation
of T cells as a function of the concentrations of Tregs and of T cells and the parameter
values. Moreover, we were able to improve these results and to obtain exact formulas
for both relations. The relation between the concentration of T cells and their antigenic
stimulation is an S-shaped curve - an hysteresis - that contains a region of bistability
bounded by two catastrophe points, the thresholds bL and bH of antigenic stimulation of
T cells. We study the effects of the asymmetry parameters in the equilibria manifold
and in the quorum T cell population thresholds and we observe that the hysteresis
can be unfolded as in the symmetric case Burroughs et al. (2006, 2008). A positive
correlation between the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the antigenic stimulation of
Tregs enhances the protection against autoimmunity, Burroughs et al. (2011b). Here
we present explicit formulas (approximate and exact) that explain the transcritical
bifurcation found in Burroughs et al. (2011b). In a neighbourhood of parameters near
this transcritical bifurcation the rate of variation of the level of stimulation determines
if an immune response appears of if the Tregs maintain control when the antigenic
stimuli increase, Pinto et al. (2010).
Investment in Patent Licensing is an active subject of the Economical Sciences. In
Chapter 3 we study a model where two firms invest in Research and Development
(R&D) to reduce their production costs, while in Cournot competition, with our results
published in Ferreira et al. (2012). Here we continue the studies published in the papers
Ferreira et al. (2009, 2010), but we study the investment function in d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) instead of the investment function in Ferreira et al. (2009).
This model is based on a two stages game, described by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) and analysed with a different investment function in Ferreira et al. (2009, 2010).
The first subgame has at most three strategic optimal investment equilibria, only one
of those, the competitive one, analysed by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). We
consider a discrete and a continuous time dynamics (both myopic). We observe a high
sensitivity to initial conditions, in particular in the continuous R&D dynamics.
Chapter 2
Immune response models with
asymmetry
2.1 Introduction
The immune system protects the host from pathogen invasion. During such an invasion,
T cells specific to the antigen proliferate and act to remove the pathogen. However, the
immune system can erroneously target self antigens (autoimmunity) and cause tissue
damage and death. Regulatory T cells, or Tregs, are a fundamental component of the T
cell repertoire, being generated in the thymus under positive selection by self peptides
Hsieh et al. (2004). The Treg repertoire is as diverse as conventional T cells Hsieh et al.
(2004) and performs vital immune suppressive functions. Removal of Tregs, e.g. by
(cell sorted) adoptive transfer experiments, causes a variety of autoimmune disorders
in rodents, whilst many autoimmune diseases can be associated with a misregulation
of Tregs, e.g. IPEX Sakaguchi (2004).
Under exposure to their specific antigen, conventional T cells are activated, leading
to secretion of growth cytokines (predominantly interleukin 2, denoted IL-2), and
expression of the interleukin 2 receptor which triggers cytokine driven proliferation.
However, in the presence of active Tregs, the growth of conventional T cells is inhibited.
Part of this growth inhibition is the inhibition of IL-2 secretion by T cells Shevach et al.
(2001); Thornton and Shevach (1998). Further, most studies indicate that regulation
is not T cell specific, i.e. Tregs inhibit all conventional T cells independent of their
antigen specificity Thornton and Shevach (2000), although a different report suggests
the contrary Tanchot et al. (2004). Tregs clearly function to limit the autoimmune
responses with a delicate balance between appropriate immune activation and immune
response suppression being achieved.
15
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How such a balance is established and controlled is the central focus of the papers
by Burroughs et al. (2006, 2008, 2011a,b). For a review see Pinto et al. (2010) and
references within. We observe that T cell proliferation through cytokines already
has a control structure: cytokine driven growth exhibits a quorum population size
threshold de Boer and Hogeweg (1987). For low antigenic stimulation b of T cells,
only one stable equilibria is found characterized by low concentrations of T cells, thus
corresponding to an controlled state. For high antigenic stimulation b of T cells, again
only one stable equilibria is found, this time corresponding to an immune response
state, with high values of the concentration of T cells, close to the capacity of T
cells. For intermediate values of the antigenic stimulation b of T cells, between two
catastrophe points bL and bH , two stable equilibria are found, a controlled and an
immune response state. Furthermore, an unstable equilibria is also present. If the
antigenic stimulation rises above the threshold bH , control is lost and autoimmunity
arises. Note that even if the antigenic stimulation level b falls to the original value,
at which control was originally achieved, control may not be reacquired. Control
is only attained if stimulation falls below the second threshold bL. This phenomena,
termed hysteresis, is common in many physical and biological systems. Burroughs et al.
(2006) propose that Tregs locally adjust these thresholds by inhibiting IL-2 secretion.
The immune response-suppression axis is then a balance between the local numbers
of activated T cells (e.g. from a pathogen encounter) and activated Tregs. Burroughs
et al. (2011b) introduce an asymmetry reflecting that the difference between the growth
and death rates can be higher for active T cells and active Tregs than for inactive T
cells and inactive Tregs. This asymmetry can be explained by the effect of memory T
cells. The memory T cells last longer than the other T cells and react more promptly
to their specific antigen Rogers et al. (2000). This results in a positive correlation
between the antigenic stimulation and the difference between the growth rate and the
death rate of T cells. Hence, this asymmetry brings up the relevance of the antigenic
stimulation of Tregs in the control of the local Treg population size, Burroughs et al.
(2011b). Moreover, under homeostasis, a larger antigenic stimulation of Tregs results
in a larger Treg population size. Furthermore, with this asymmetry, Burroughs et al.
(2011b) observe a faster immune response and an improvement in the simulation of
the bystander proliferation. Additionally, Burroughs et al. (2011b) found a positive
correlation between the antigenic stimulation of Tregs and the thresholds bL and bH
of antigenic stimulation of T cells. With it, by adjusting the level of self-antigenic
stimulation of Tregs to different levels, organs can have different levels of protection
against the development of an (auto-)immune response by T cells. Antigen presenting
cells (APC), such as dendritic cells can stimulate both T cells and Tregs, Leo´n et al.
(2003). We will study a relation between the antigenic stimulation a of Tregs and the
antigenic stimulation b of T cells. For simplicity, we will analyse a linear tuning between
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these stimuli as in Burroughs et al. (2011b), with the slope parameter modeling the
effect of the antigen presenting cells (APC). Changing the slope parameter reveals the
presence of an isola. Additionally, a transcritical bifurcation occurs when the isola
merges with the hysteresis, Burroughs et al. (2011b). This transcritical bifurcation
may give rise to two alternative scenarios, depending on the rate of increase of the
antigenic stimuli: in one case the appearance of autoimmune responses (fast increase)
and in another case the suppression of the immune responses (slow increase), Pinto
et al. (2010).
This Thesis encompasses the results that we have obtained in this model. In Section 2.2,
we present our immune response model as a set of five ordinary differential equations.
In Section 2.3, we present approximate and exact formulas for the balance between
the concentration of T cells and the concentration of Tregs, the antigen function that
relates these two concentrations and the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the antigen
function when we consider a tuning between the antigenic stimuli. We discuss the
results in Section 2.4.
2.2 Theory
There are a number of different (CD4) T cell regulatory phenotypes reported; we use
a model of Tregs that are currently identified as CD25+ T cells, although this is not
a definitive molecular marker. At a genetic level, these Tregs express Foxp3, a master
regulator of the Treg phenotype inducing CD25, CTLA-4 and GITR expression, all
correlating with a suppressive phenotype Sakaguchi (2004).
Figure 2.1: Model schematic showing growth, death and phenotype transitions of the
Treg populations R,R∗, and autoimmune T cell T, T ∗ populations. Cytokine dynamics
are not shown: IL-2 is secreted by activated T cells T ∗ and adsorbed by all the T cell
populations. Reproduced from Burroughs et al. (2011b).
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Our model from Burroughs et al. (2011b) uses a population of Tregs and conventional
T cells with processes shown schematically in Figure 2.1. Both populations require
antigenic stimulation for activation. Levels of antigenic stimulation are denoted a and
b for Tregs and conventional T cells respectively. Tregs are activated by self antigens
from an inactive state, denoted R, to an active state R∗. The IL-2 secreting T cells are
denoted T ∗ and the non secreting T cells are denoted T . On activation conventional
T cells secrete IL-2 and acquire proliferative capacity in the presence of IL-2. Tregs
also proliferate in the presence of IL-2 although less efficiently than normal T cells
Thornton and Shevach (1998), and they do not secrete IL-2. Finally, we include an
influx of (auto) immune T cells into the tissue (Tinput) and Tregs (Rinput), which can
represent T cell circulation or naive T cell input from the thymus.
The model consists of a set of ordinary differential equations. We have a compartment
for each T cell population (inactive Tregs R, active Tregs R∗, non secreting T cells T ,
secreting activated T cells T ∗) and interleukin 2 density I:
dR
dt
= (ǫρI−β(R +R∗ + T + T ∗)− dR)R + kˆ(R∗ − aR) +Rinput, (2.1)
dR∗
dt
= (ǫρI−β(R +R∗ + T + T ∗)− dR∗)R∗ − kˆ(R∗ − aR), (2.2)
dT
dt
= (ρI − β(R +R∗+T + T ∗)− dT )T + k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) + Tinput, (2.3)
dT ∗
dt
= (ρI − β(R +R∗+T + T ∗)− dT ∗)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗), (2.4)
dI
dt
= σ(T ∗ − (α(R +R∗+T + T ∗) + δ)I). (2.5)
The parameters of the model are in Table 2.1, adapted from Burroughs et al. (2006,
2011b); Figueiredo et al. (2014). The column value indicate the default values of the
parameters used in the figures.
The model studied here keeps the basic properties of the immune response by T cells,
controlled by Tregs, that were present in Burroughs et al. (2006, 2008). The main
distinction of this model is the asymmetry in the difference between the growth and
death rates modeled as in Burroughs et al. (2011a,b); Pinto et al. (2010). With this
kind of asymmetry present for the T cells, an increase in the antigenic stimulation of T
cells results in an increase in the population of T cells caused both by the increase in
cytokine secretion and by the decrease in the average death rate of T cells. Furthermore,
the asymmetry improves the dynamic behavior of the model, introduced in Burroughs
et al. (2006), as shown previously in Burroughs et al. (2011a,b).
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Parameter Symbol Range Value
T cell T , T ∗
T cell Maximum growth ratea ρ
/
α < 6 day−1 4 day−1
Death rate of inactive T cells dT 0.1− 0.01 day
−1 0.1 day−1
Michie et al. (1992)
Death rate ratio of active : inactive T cells dT∗/dT 0.01− 100 0.1
Capacity of T cellsb ρ
/
(αβ) 106 − 107 cells/ml 107 cells/ml
Moskophidis et al. (1995)
Input rate of inactive T cells Tinput 0− 10
4 cells/ml/day 0.100 cells/ml/day
Secretion reversion (constant)c k hrs-days 0.1 hr−1
Antigen stimulation level bk 0.001− 200× akˆ Bifurcation parameter
Tregs R, R∗
Growth rate ratio Tregs : T cells ǫ < 1 0.6
Homeostatic capacity Rhom 10− 10
5 cells/ml 1.4× 103 cells/ml
Relaxation rate kˆ hrs-days 0.1 hr−1
Death rate ratio of inactive Tregs : T cells dR
/
dT 0.01− 100 1
Death rate relative ratio of Tregs : T cells
dR∗
dR
/ dT∗
dT
0.01− 100 1
Input rate ratio of inactive Tregs : inactive T Rinput
/
Tinput 0.01− 100 1
Treg antigen stimulation level akˆ 0− 10 day−1 1 day−1
Secretion inhibitiond γ 0.1− 100×R−1
hom
10 R−1
hom
Cytokines
Max. cytokine concentratione 1
/
α 100− 500 pM 200 pM
IL-2 secretion rate σ f 0.07, 2 fgrms h−1 106 molecs s−1 cell−1
Veiga-Fernandes et al. (2000)
Cytokine decay rate σδ hrs-days 1.5 hr −1
Anderson and Sorenson (1994)
a Minimum duration of SG2M phase αρ−1 ≈ 3hrs.
b Maximum T cell density for severe infections (based on LCMV).
c This is in absence of Tregs.
d This is in terms of the homeostatic Treg level Rhom.
e This is taken as 20 times the receptor affinity (10pM Lowenthal and Greene (1987)).
f Naive and memory cells respectively. This corresponds to 3000-105 molecules per h, IL-2 mass 15-18 kDa.
Table 2.1: Parameters of the model.
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2.3 Equilibria of the model
In a ODE model, the equilibria, stable or unstable, is the set of points where all the
derivatives vanish. Let x = T +T ∗ be the total concentration of T cells and y = R+R∗
be the total concentration of Tregs. When the system is at equilibrium we have that:
σ(T ∗ − (α(x+ y) + δ)I) = 0 , (2.6)
(ǫρI−β(x+ y)− dR)R + kˆ(R∗ − aR) +Rinput = 0 , (2.7)
(ǫρI−β(x+ y)− dR∗)R∗ − kˆ(R∗ − aR) = 0 , (2.8)
(ρI − β(x+ y)− dT )T + k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) + Tinput = 0 , (2.9)
(ρI − β(x+ y)− dT ∗)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT+γR∗T ∗) = 0. (2.10)
Let ∆T = dT − dT ∗ and θ = k(1 + b) − ∆T . When ∆T ≪ k, the T , T ∗ balance is
much faster than the T cell death rates. We can use this information to obtain an
approximate expression of the relation between T ∗ and x.
Lemma 1. When the system is at equilibrium (stable or unstable) and ∆T ≪ k, the
concentration of active T cells T ∗ is given approximately by
T ∗ ≈ kbx
2
(θ + kγR∗)x+ Tinput
. (2.11)
Remark: For the default values of the parameters, we observe that ∆T = 0.09≪ 2.4 =
k . We can observe in figure 2.2 that, for different values of y, the difference between
the approximate value and the exact value of T ∗ is smaller than 1%.
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
1
1.001
1.002
1.003
1.004
1.005
1.006
1.007
1.008
1.009
1.01
y=R+R*
di
f T
Figure 2.2: Relative deviation difT = T
∗
approx/T
∗
exact between the approximate value of
T ∗ obtained from the Lemma 1 and the exact value.
Tinput = 10 (dashes), 100 (solid), and 10000 (dash-dot). The colors indicate when it is
plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from Theorem 3.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
Adding (2.9) and (2.10), we obtain
ρI−β(x+ y) = dTT + dT ∗T
∗ − Tinput
T + T ∗
. (2.12)
Subtracting (2.10) from (2.9), we get
(ρI−β(x+ y))(T − T ∗)− dTT + dT ∗T ∗
+2k(T ∗ − bT + γR∗T ∗) + Tinput = 0 . (2.13)
Replacing (2.12) in (2.13) we get
T − T ∗
T + T ∗
(dTT + dT ∗T
∗ − Tinput)− dTT + dT ∗T ∗
+2k(T ∗ − bT + γR∗T ∗) + Tinput = 0 . (2.14)
Since T = x− T ∗, we have that T−T ∗
T+T ∗
= 1− 2T ∗
x
and we obtain,
dT (x− T ∗) + dT ∗T ∗ − Tinput − 2T
∗
x
(dT (x− T ∗) + dT ∗T ∗ − Tinput)
−dT (x− T ∗) + dT ∗T ∗
+2k(T ∗ − b(x− T ∗) + γR∗T ∗) + Tinput = 0 . (2.15)
Multiplying equation (2.15) by x/2, reordering the terms and substituting ∆T = dT −
dT ∗ and θ = k(1 + b)−∆T , we get
∆T (T
∗)2 + ((θ + kγR∗) x+ Tinput)T
∗ − kbx2 = 0 . (2.16)
We have a polynomial of the second degree in T ∗. By using H(x,R∗) = (θ+ kγR∗)x+
Tinput, we get
T ∗ =
−H ±√H2 + 4∆Tkbx2
2∆T
. (2.17)
We must have T ∗ > 0, therefore we will only get the positive root. By assuming that
∆T ≪ k, we can make a first order Taylor expansion of the square root around 1. Since
kb . θ and ∆T ≪ θ, we have that
∆Tkbx
2 . ∆T θx
2 ≪ θ2x2 < H2 . (2.18)
Therefore,
√
H2 + 4∆Tkbx2 =
√(
1 +
4∆Tkbx2
H2
)
H2 ≈
(
1 +
2∆Tkbx
2
H2
)
H . (2.19)
From (2.17) and (2.19) we get
T ∗ =
−H +
(
1 + 2∆T kbx
2
H2
)
H
2∆T
+O(2) . (2.20)
Simplifying this equation and using the expression of H(x,R∗), we obtain (2.11).

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2.3.1 Equilibria in the absence of the Tregs
We consider the simplified model of the immune response by T cells in the absence of
Tregs, by assuming that R = R∗ = 0, thus eliminating equations (2.7) and (2.8):
dI
dt
= σ(T ∗ − (α(T + T ∗) + δ)I),
dT
dt
= (ρI − β(T + T ∗)− dT )T + k(T ∗ − bT ) + Tinput,
dT ∗
dt
= (ρI − β(T + T ∗)− dT ∗)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT ).
Let
∆T = dT − dT ∗
E(x) = (αx+ δ)(dTx− Tinput + βx2)
F (x) = ρx+∆T (αx+ δ) . (2.21)
Theorem 1. Let b0(x) be the antigen function in the absence of Tregs. The level of
antigenic stimulation of T cells is given approximately by b0(x), when the simplified
system in the absence of Tregs is at equilibrium (stable or unstable).
b0(x) =
(
(k −∆T )x+ Tinput
)
E
k
(
xF − E)x . (2.22)
Conversely, given an antigenic stimulation level b0 of T cells, the concentration x of T
cells is a zero of a fourth order polynomial that can be explicitly constructed.
Proof of Theorem 1:
When the system is at equilibrium we have that:
σ(T ∗ − (αx+ δ)I) = 0 , (2.23)
(ρI − βx− dT )T + k(T ∗ − bT ) + Tinput = 0 , (2.24)
(ρI − βx− dT ∗)T ∗ − k(T ∗ − bT ) = 0. (2.25)
Solving (2.23) for T ∗ gives
T ∗ = I(αx+ δ) . (2.26)
Adding (2.24) and (2.25), we obtain
(ρI − βx− dT )T + (ρI − βx− dT ∗)T ∗ + Tinput = 0 . (2.27)
Reordering the terms gives
(ρI − βx)(T + T ∗)− dTT − dT ∗T ∗ + Tinput = 0 . (2.28)
CHAPTER 2. IMMUNE RESPONSE MODELS WITH ASYMMETRY 23
Isolating ρI − βx we get
ρI − βx = dTT + dT ∗T
∗ − Tinput
T + T ∗
. (2.29)
Replacing (2.26) in (2.29) and using T = x− T ∗ we get,(
ρ
(
T ∗
αx+ δ
)
− βx
)
(x− T ∗ + T ∗) = dT (x− T ∗) + dT ∗T ∗ − Tinput . (2.30)
Using ∆T = dT − dT ∗ we have,
ρ
(
T ∗
αx+ δ
)
x− βx2 = dTx−∆TT ∗ − Tinput . (2.31)
Multiplying both sides by αx+ δ
ρxT ∗ − (αx+ δ)βx2 = (αx+ δ)(dTx−∆TT ∗ − Tinput) . (2.32)
Isolating the terms with T ∗ gives
(ρx+∆T (αx+ δ))T
∗ = (αx+ δ)(dTx− Tinput) + (αx+ δ)βx2 . (2.33)
Replacing E(x) = (αx+ δ)(dTx−Tinput+βx2) and F (x) = ρx+∆T (αx+ δ), results in
T ∗F = E . (2.34)
Applying Lemma 1 for R∗ = 0 we get,( kbx2
θx+ Tinput
)
F = E . (2.35)
Since θ = k(1 + b)−∆T = k + kb−∆T , we obtain
kbx2F = (k + kb−∆T )xE + TinputE . (2.36)
Moving the terms with b to the left side of the equation, we get
b(kx2F − xkE) = x(k −∆T )E + TinputE . (2.37)
By solving equation (2.37) for b we obtain (2.22).

Theorem 2. Let b0(x) be the antigen function in the absence of Tregs. The level of
antigenic stimulation of T cells is given exactly by b0(x), when the simplified system in
the absence of Tregs is at equilibrium (stable or unstable).
b0(x) =
(
∆TE +
(
(k −∆T )x+ Tinput
)
F
)
E
k
(
xF − E)xF . (2.38)
Conversely, given an antigenic stimulation level b0 of T cells, the concentration x of T
cells is a zero of a sixth order polynomial that can be explicitly constructed.
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Proof of Theorem 2:
We must take the positive root (T ∗ > 0) of equation (2.17) and replacing in (2.34).(−H +√H2 + 4∆Tkbx2
2∆T
)
F = E . (2.39)
Multiplying by 2∆T and isolating the square root
F
√
H2 + 4∆Tkbx2 = 2∆TE + FH . (2.40)
Squaring both sides we have that
F 2H2 + 4∆Tkbx
2F 2 = 4∆2TE
2 + 4∆TEFH + F
2H2 . (2.41)
Simplifying the terms F 2H2 and dividing both sides by 4∆T gives
kbx2F 2 = ∆TE
2 + EFH . (2.42)
By using H(x,R∗) = (θ + kγR∗)x+ Tinput and R
∗ = 0, we get
kbx2F 2 = ∆TE
2 + (θx+ Tinput)EF . (2.43)
Since θ = k(1 + b)−∆T = kb+ k −∆T we obtain
kbx2F 2 = ∆TE
2 + (kbx+ (k −∆T )x+ Tinput)EF . (2.44)
Organizing the terms with b gives
k(xF − E)xFb = (∆TE + ((k −∆T )x+ Tinput)F)E . (2.45)
By solving equation (2.45) for b we obtain (2.38).

2.3.2 Equilibria in the presence of the Tregs
We now study the full model, with both T cells and Tregs. Let ∆R = dR − dR∗ and
λ = kˆ(1 + a) −∆R. Similarly to what is observed for the T cells, when ∆R ≪ kˆ, the
R, R∗ balance is much faster than the Treg death rates. Once more, we can use this
information to obtain an approximate expression of the relation between R∗ and y.
Lemma 2. When the system is at equilibrium (stable or unstable) and ∆R ≪ kˆ, the
concentration of active Tregs R∗ is given approximately by
R∗ ≈ kˆay
2
λy +Rinput
. (2.46)
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Figure 2.3: Relative deviation difR = R
∗
approx/R
∗
exact between the approximate value of
R∗ obtained from the Lemma 2 and the exact value.
Tinput = 10 (dashes), 100 (solid), and 10000 (dash-dot).
Remark: For the default values of the parameters, we observe that ∆R = 0.09≪ 2.4 =
kˆ . We can observe in figure 2.3 that, for different values of y, the relative difference
between the approximate value and the exact value of R∗ is smaller than 1%.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Adding (2.7) and (2.8), we obtain
ǫρI−β(x+ y) = dRR + dR∗R
∗ −Rinput
R +R∗
. (2.47)
Subtracting (2.8) from (2.7), we get
(ǫρI−β(x+ y))(R−R∗)− dRR + dR∗R∗ + 2kˆ(R∗ − aR) +Rinput = 0 . (2.48)
Replacing (2.47) in (2.48) we get
R−R∗
R +R∗
(dRR + dR∗R
∗ −Rinput)− dRR + dR∗R∗ + 2kˆ(R∗ − aR) +Rinput = 0 . (2.49)
Since R = y −R∗, we have that R−R∗
R+R∗
= 1− 2R∗
y
. Hence we obtain,
dR(y −R∗) + dR∗R∗ −Rinput − 2R
∗
y
(dR(y −R∗) + dR∗R∗ −Rinput)−
−dR(y −R∗) + dR∗R∗ + 2kˆ(R∗ − a(y −R∗)) +Rinput = 0 . (2.50)
Multiplying equation (2.50) by y/2, reordering the terms and using λ = kˆ(1 + a)−∆R,
we obtain
∆R(R
∗)2 + (λy +Rinput)R
∗ − kˆay2 = 0 . (2.51)
The above is polynomial of the second degree in R∗. By substituting L(y) = λy+Rinput,
we get
R∗ =
−L±
√
L2 + 4∆Rkˆay2
2∆R
. (2.52)
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We must have R∗ > 0, therefore we will only get the positive root. By assuming that
∆R ≪ kˆ, we can make a first order Taylor expansion of the square root around 1. Since
kˆa . λ and ∆R ≪ λ, we have that
∆Rkˆay
2 . ∆Rλy
2 ≪ λ2y2 < L2 . (2.53)
Therefore
√
L2 + 4∆Rkˆay2 =
√√√√(1 + 4∆Rkˆay2
L2
)
L2 ≈
(
1 +
2∆Rkˆay
2
L2
)
L . (2.54)
From (2.52) and (2.54) we get
R∗ =
−L+
(
1 + 2∆Rkˆay
2
L2
)
L
2∆R
+O(2) . (2.55)
Simplifying this equation and using the expression of L(y) we obtain (2.46).

Using Lemma 2, we can obtain a polynomial that gives the balance between the
concentration of T cells x = T + T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R + R∗
(see Figure 2.4). Let
C(x, y) = ((ǫdT − dR)− β(1− ǫ)(x+ y)) xy
G(x, y) = ρx+∆T (α(x+ y) + δ)
L(y) = λy +Rinput
P22 = βλ (α∆T + ρ(1− ǫ))
P21 = βRinput (α∆T + ρ(1− ǫ))
P13 = βλ (2α∆T + ρ(1− ǫ))
P12 = βRinput (2α∆T + ρ(1− ǫ)) + λ (ρ(dR − ǫdT ) + ∆T (αdR + βδ))− kˆa∆R(ρ+ α∆T )
P11 = Rinput
(
ρ(dR − ǫdT ) + ∆T (αdR + βδ)− λ(ρ+ α∆T )
)
P10 = −R2input (ρ+ α∆T )
P04 = αβλ∆T
P03 = ∆T
(
αβRinput + λ (αdR + βδ)− αkˆa∆R
)
P02 = ∆TRinput (αdR + βδ) + λ (ǫρTinput − α∆TRinput + δ∆TdR)− δkˆa∆T∆R
P01 = Rinput
(
ǫρTinput − α∆TRinput + δ∆T (dR − λ)
)
P00 = −δ∆TR2input . (2.56)
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Theorem 3. When the system is at equilibrium (stable or unstable) and ∆R ≪ kˆ, the
approximate concentration of T cells x = T + T ∗ is given implicitly as function of the
concentration of Tregs y = R +R∗ by the zeros of the second degree polynomial in x:
P22x
2y2 + P21x
2y + P13xy
3 + P12xy
2 + P11xy + P10x
+P04y
4 + P03y
3 + P02y
2 + P01y + P00 = 0 . (2.57)
Conversely, the concentration y of Tregs is given implicitly as a function of the con-
centration x of T cells by the zeros of the above fourth order polynomial in y.
We observe that the the concentration y of Tregs is higher for values of the concentration
x of T cells near 104 − 105, see Figure 2.4.
A B
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100
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108
x=T+T*
y=
R+
R*
Figure 2.4: Relation between the concentration of T cells x = T+T ∗, the concentration
of Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation Tinput, from Theorem 3.
A: Horizontal axis: x = T + T ∗; ”away axis”: Tinput; vertical axis: y = R + R
∗. Low
values of b are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for Tinput = 10 (dashes), 100
(solid), and 10000 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the total concentration x = T+T ∗
of T cells, and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R + R∗ of Tregs. The
colors indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x
from Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Isolating ρI from (2.12) gives:
ρI =
dTT + dT ∗T
∗ − Tinput
T + T ∗
+ β(x+ y) . (2.58)
By replacing (2.58) in (2.12) we obtain
ǫ
(
dTT + dT ∗T
∗ − Tinput
T + T ∗
+ β(x+ y)
)
− β(x+ y) = dRR + dR∗R
∗ −Rinput
R +R∗
. (2.59)
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Since T = x− T ∗ and R = y −R∗, and multiplying (2.59) by xy results in
((ǫdT − dR)− β(1− ǫ)(x+ y)) xy − ǫy ((dT ∗ − dT )T ∗ − Tinput)−
−x ((dR∗ − dR)R∗ −Rinput) = 0 . (2.60)
Using C(x, y) from (2.56), ∆T = dT − dT ∗ and ∆R = dR − dR∗ in (2.60) gives
C − ǫy (∆TT ∗ + Tinput) + x (∆RR∗ +Rinput) = 0 . (2.61)
Multiplying (2.12) by x and using T = x− T ∗, we obtain
ρIx− β(x+ y)x = dT (x− T ∗) + dT ∗T ∗ − Tinput . (2.62)
Reordering the terms of the previous expression and using ∆T = dT − dT ∗ we have
ρIx+∆TT
∗ = β(x+ y)x+ dTx− Tinput . (2.63)
Solving (2.6) for I we get
I =
T ∗
α(x+ y) + δ
. (2.64)
Replacing (2.64) in (2.63) we get
ρx
α(x+ y) + δ
T ∗ +∆TT
∗ = β(x+ y)x+ dTx− Tinput . (2.65)
Multiplying both sides of (2.65) by α(x+ y) + δ and solving for T ∗ we obtain
T ∗ =
(α(x+ y) + δ) (β(x+ y)x+ dTx− Tinput)
ρx+∆T (α(x+ y) + δ)
. (2.66)
Replacing (2.66) in (2.61), reordering the terms and using G(x, y) from (2.56), we get
C − ǫy
(
∆T
(α(x+ y) + δ) (β(x+ y)x+ dTx− Tinput)
G
+ Tinput
)
+
+x (∆RR
∗ +Rinput) = 0 . (2.67)
Applying Lemma 2, using L(y) from (2.56) and multiplying by G(x, y)L(y) we have
CGL− ǫy(∆T (α(x+ y) + δ) (β(x+ y)x+ dTx− Tinput) + TinputG)L+
+x
(
∆Rkˆay
2 +RinputL
)
G = 0 . (2.68)
Simplifying the previous expression, we obtain an implicit relation between the con-
centration of T cell x = T + T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R + R∗ given by
(2.57). We note that C(x, y), G(x, y) and L(y) are polynomials.

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Theorem 4 presents a polynomial that gives the exact balance between the concentra-
tion of T cells x = T+T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗. Let ∆R = dR−dR∗ ,
∆T = dT − dT ∗ , λ = kˆ(1 + a)−∆R, θ = k(1 + b)−∆T ,
Z1 = ρ+ α∆T
Z2 = β(1− ǫ)
Z3 = ǫdT − dR
Z4 = (λδ − αRinput)∆T
Z5 = δRinput∆T
Z6 = αβ∆T
Z7 = αλ∆T
Z8 = akˆ∆R∆T
Z9 = (αdR + βδ)∆T , (2.69)
and let
N1 = Z6 + ρZ2
N2 = 2Z6 + ρZ2
N3 = Z9 − ρZ3
N4 = Z6
N5 = Z9
N6 = α∆TdR + ρǫTinput . (2.70)
Let Wij = 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 4 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 5 except:
W41 = N
2
1
W32 = 2N1N2
W31 = 2N1N3 + λN1Z1
W30 = −λRinputN1Z1
W23 = 2N1N4 +N
2
2
W22 = 2(N1N5 +N2N3) +N1Z7 + λN2Z1
W21 = 2N1N6 +N
2
3 +N1Z4 −RinputN2Z1 + λN3Z1 + akˆ∆RZ21
W20 = −N1Z5 −RinputN3Z1 + λRinputZ21
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W14 = 2N2N4
W13 = 2(N2N5 +N3N4) +N2Z7 + λN4Z1
W12 = 2(N2N6 +N3N5) +N2Z4 +N3Z7 −RinputN4Z1 + λN5Z1 + 2αZ1Z8
W11 = 2N3N6 −N2Z5 +N3Z4 −RinputN5Z1 + λN6Z1 + 2(RinputZ7 + δZ8)Z1
W10 = −N3Z5 −RinputN6Z1 + 2λZ1Z5
W05 = N
2
4
W04 = 2N4N5 +N4Z7
W03 = 2N4N6 +N
2
5 +N4Z4 +N5Z7 + α
2∆TZ8
W02 = 2N5N6 −N4Z5 +N5Z4 +N6Z7 + α∆T (2δZ8 +RinputZ7)
W01 = N
2
6 −N5Z5 +N6Z4 + δ∆T (δZ8 + 2RinputZ7)
W00 = −N6Z5 + δλ∆TZ5 . (2.71)
Theorem 4. Let Wij be as above. When the system is at equilibrium (stable or
unstable), the exact concentration of T cells x = T + T ∗ is given implicitly as function
of the concentration of Tregs y = R + R∗ by the zeros of the fourth order polynomial
in x:
4∑
i=0
5∑
j=0
Wijx
iyj = 0 (2.72)
Conversely, the exact concentration y of Tregs is given implicitly as a function of the
concentration x of T cells by the zeros of the above fifth order polynomial in y.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Using C(x, y) from (2.56) we can define
C0(x, y) = C − ǫyTinput
C1(x, y) = C0 − ǫy∆TT ∗ . (2.73)
Applying C1(x, y) in (2.61) gives
C1 +Rinputx+∆RxR
∗ = 0 . (2.74)
We must have R∗ > 0. Thus, we take the positive root from (2.52). Replacing it in
(2.74) we obtain
C1 +Rinputx+∆Rx

−L+
√
L2 + 4akˆ∆Ry2
2∆R

 = 0 . (2.75)
Multiplying (2.75) by 2 and isolating the square root we get
2C1 + 2Rinputx− xL = −x
√
L2 + 4akˆ∆Ry2 . (2.76)
CHAPTER 2. IMMUNE RESPONSE MODELS WITH ASYMMETRY 31
Squaring both sides of (2.76) we obtain
4C21+8RinputxC1−4xC1L+4x2R2input−4x2RinputL+x2L2 = x2L2+4akˆ∆Rx2y2 . (2.77)
Simplifying the terms x2L2, dividing (2.77) by 4 and reorganizing the terms gives
C21 + (2Rinput − L)xC1 + (Rinput − L)Rinputx2 − akˆ∆Rx2y2 = 0 . (2.78)
Since L(y) = λy +Rinput,
C21 + (Rinput − λy)xC1 − λRinputx2y − akˆ∆Rx2y2 = 0 . (2.79)
Let
C2(x, y) = α(x+ y) + δ
C3(x, y) = β(x+ y)x
C4(x, y) = C3 + dTx− Tinput
G(x, y) = ρx+∆TC2
N(x, y) = −C1G
U(x, y) = (λy −Rinput)x
V (x, y) = akˆ∆Rx
2y2 + λRinputx
2y . (2.80)
Multiplying equation (2.79) by G2(x, y) and using the definitions of N(x, y), U(x, y)
and V (x, y) we have
N2 +GNU +G2V = 0 . (2.81)
In order to present the polynomial that equation (2.81) represents, we will start by
computing N(x, y). Applying (2.80), the formula for T ∗ in (2.66) becomes
T ∗ =
C2C4
G
. (2.82)
Therefore, multiplying equation (2.73) by −G(x, y) gives
N(x, y) = ǫ∆TyC2C4 − C0G . (2.83)
Applying the definitions of C0(x, y), C4(x, y) and G(x, y)
N(x, y) = ǫ∆TyC2
(
C3 + dTx− Tinput
)− (C − ǫTinputy)(ρx+∆TC2) . (2.84)
Using (2.56) and the definitions of Z3 from (2.69) we have
C(x, y) = Z3xy − (1− ǫ)yC3 . (2.85)
Applying in (2.84) we obtain
N(x, y) = ǫ∆TyC2
(
C3 + dTx− Tinput
)
−(Z3xy − (1− ǫ)yC3 − ǫTinputy)(ρx+∆TC2) . (2.86)
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Expanding the products gives
N(x, y) = ǫ∆TyC2C3 + ǫ∆TdTxyC2 − ǫ∆TTinputyC2
−ρZ3x2y + (1− ǫ)ρxyC3 + ǫρTinputxy
−∆TZ3xyC2 + (1− ǫ)∆TyC2C3 + ǫ∆TTinputyC2 . (2.87)
Reordering the terms we have
N(x, y) = ∆T (ǫ+ 1− ǫ)yC2C3 +∆T
(
ǫdTx− ǫTinput − Z3x+ ǫTinput
)
yC2
+(1− ǫ)ρxC3 + ρ(ǫTinput − Z3x)xy . (2.88)
Simplifying and applying the definitions of Z3, C2(x, y) and C3(x, y) gives
N(x, y) = ∆Ty(αx+ αy + δ)β(x+ y)x+∆T
(
ǫdTx− (ǫdT − dR)x
)
y(αx+ αy + δ)
+(1− ǫ)ρxyβ(x+ y)x+ ρ(ǫTinput − Z3x)xy . (2.89)
By expanding the products we obtain
N(x, y) = β∆T
(
α(x2 + 2xy + y2) + δx+ δy
)
xy +∆TdR(αx
2y + αxy2 + δxy)
+(1− ǫ)βρ(x3y + x2y2) + ǫρTinputxy − ρZ3x2y . (2.90)
Ordering the terms and using the definitions of Zi from (2.69) gives
N(x, y) =
(
Z6 + ρZ2
)
x3y +
(
2Z6 + ρZ2
)
x2y2
+
(
δβ∆T + α∆TdR − ρZ3
)
x2y + Z3xy
3
+Z9xy
2 +
(
δ∆TdR + ǫρTinput
)
xy . (2.91)
Using the definitions of Ni from (2.70) we have that
N(x, y) = N1x
3y +N2x
2y2 +N3x
2y +N4xy
3 +N5xy
2 +N6xy . (2.92)
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Computing the product N2(x, y) yields:
N2(x, y) = N21x
6y2
+2N1N2x
5y3
+2N1N3x
5y2
+
(
2N1N4 +N
2
2
)
x4y4
+2
(
N1N5 +N2N3
)
x4y3
+
(
2N1N6 +N
2
3
)
x4y2
+2N2N4x
3y5
+2
(
N2N5 +N3N4
)
x3y4
+2
(
N2N6 +N3N5
)
x3y3
+2N3N6x
3y2
+N24x
2y6
+2N4N5x
2y5
+
(
2N4N6 +N
2
5
)
x2y4
+2N5N6x
2y3
+N26x
2y2 . (2.93)
We will now obtain the polynomial of the second parcel of (2.81). Using the definition
of C2(x, y) in G(x, y) gives
G(x, y) = ρx+∆T (α(x+ y) + δ) . (2.94)
Applying the definition of Z1 from (2.69), we obtain
G(x, y) = Z1x+ α∆Ty + δ∆T . (2.95)
Using the definition of U(x, y) from (2.80), we can compute the product GU(x, y)
GU(x, y) = λZ1x
2y −RinputZ1x2 + αλ∆Txy2
+∆T (δλ− αRinput)xy − δ∆TRinputx . (2.96)
Using the definitions of Zi from (2.69) we have that
GU(x, y) = λZ1x
2y −RinputZ1x2 + Z7xy2 + Z4xy − Z5x . (2.97)
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Multiplying the equation above by N(x, y) gives
GNU(x, y) = λN1Z1x
5y2 −RinputN1Z1x5y
+N1Z7x
4y3 +N1Z4x
4y2 −N1Z5x4y
+λN2Z1x
4y3 −RinputN2Z1x4y2 +N2Z7x3y4
+N2Z4x
3y3 −N2Z5x3y2 + λN3Z1x4y2 −RinputN3Z1x4y
+N3Z7x
3y3 +N3Z4x
3y2 −N3Z5x3y
+λN4Z1x
3y4 −RinputN4Z1x3y3 +N4Z7x2y5
+N4Z4x
2y4 −N4Z5x2y3 + λN5Z1x3y3
−RinputN5Z1x3y2 +N5Z7x2y4 +N5Z4x2y3
−N5Z5x2y2 + λN6Z1x3y2 −RinputN6Z1x3y
+N6Z7x
2y3 +N6Z4x
2y2 −N6Z5x2y . (2.98)
Reorganizing the terms we obtain
GNU(x, y) = λN1Z1x
5y2
−RinputN1Z1x5y
+(N1Z7 + λN2Z1)x
4y3
+
(
N1Z4 −RinputN2Z1 + λN3Z1
)
x4y2
−(N1Z5 +RinputN3Z1)x4y
+(N2Z7 + λN4Z1)x
3y4
+(N2Z4 +N3Z7 −RinputN4Z1 + λN5Z1)x3y3
+(−N2Z5 +N3Z4 −RinputN5Z1 + λN6Z1)x3y2
−(N3Z5 +RinputN6Z1)x3y
+N4Z7x
2y5
+(N4Z4 +N5Z7)x
2y4
+(−N4Z5 +N5Z4 +N6Z7)x2y3
+(−N5Z5 +N6Z4)x2y2
−N6Z5x2y . (2.99)
Finally we will present the polynomial of the third parcel of (2.81). From (2.95) we
can compute the product G2(x, y)
G2(x, y) = Z21x
2 + 2α∆TZ1xy + 2δ∆TZ1x+ α
2∆2Ty
2 + 2αδ∆2Ty + δ
2∆2T . (2.100)
By using the definition of V (x, y) from (2.80), we can multiply it with (2.100) to obtain
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G2V (x, y).
G2V (x, y) = akˆ∆RZ
2
1x
4y2 + 2αakˆ∆R∆TZ1x
3y3
+2δakˆ∆R∆TZ1x
3y2 + α2akˆ∆R∆
2
Tx
2y4
+2αδakˆ∆R∆
2
Tx
2y3 + δ2akˆ∆R∆
2
Tx
2y2
+λRinputZ
2
1x
4y + 2αλRinput∆TZ1x
3y2
+2δλRinput∆TZ1x
3y + α2λRinput∆
2
Tx
2y3
+2αδλRinput∆
2
Tx
2y2 + δ2λRinput∆
2
Tx
2y . (2.101)
Using the definitions of Zi from (2.69) and ordering the terms we have that
G2V (x, y) = akˆ∆RZ
2
1x
4y2
+λRinputZ
2
1x
4y
+2αZ1Z8x
3y3
+2Z1 (δZ8 +RinputZ7) x
3y2
+2λZ1Z5x
3y
+α2∆TZ8x
2y4
+α∆T (2δZ8 +RinputZ7) x
2y3
+δ∆T (δZ8 + 2RinputZ7) x
2y2
+δλ∆TZ5x
2y . (2.102)
We note that N(x, y) is divisible by xy, U(x, y) is divisible by x and V (x, y) is divisible
by x2y. Therefore we can add equations (2.93), (2.99) and (2.102) to obtain N2 +
GNU +G2V = 0 and divide the sum by x2y to obtain (2.72).

From Theorem 3, we are able to build the antigen function that relates the concentra-
tion of T cells x = T + T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R+R∗ with the level of
the antigenic stimulation of T cells b. Let
λ = kˆ(1 + a)−∆R
θ = k(1 + b)−∆T
C(x, y) = ((ǫdT − dR)− β(1− ǫ)(x+ y)) xy
L(y) = λy +Rinput
J(x, y) = ǫ∆TkxyL
M(x, y) = C − Tinputǫy +Rinputx
M1(x, y) = ML+∆Rakˆxy
2
Q(x, y) = akkˆγxy2 + TinputL . (2.103)
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Figure 2.5: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of T
cells x = T + T ∗ and the relation Tinput.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: Tinput; vertical axis: x = T + T
∗. Low values of
y = R +R∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for Tinput = 10 (dashes), 100
(solid), and 10000 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T
cells, and the vertical axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗ of T cells. The colors
indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from
Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.6: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of
Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation Tinput.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: Tinput; vertical axis: y = R + R
∗. Low values of
x = T + T ∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for Tinput = 10 (dashes), 100
(solid), and 10000 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T
cells and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R + R∗ of Tregs. The colors
indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from
Theorem 3.
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Theorem 5. Let b(x, y) be the antigen function, and let x(y) (or y(x)) be as in Theorem
3. The approximate level of the antigenic stimulation of T cells is given by b(x, y), when
the system is at equilibrium (stable or unstable).
b(x, y) =
(
(k −∆T )Lx+Q
)
M1(
J − kM1
)
Lx
. (2.104)
Conversely, given an antigenic stimulation level b of T cells, the approximate concentra-
tion x of T cells and the approximate concentration y of Tregs are zeros of polynomials
that can be explicitly constructed of degree three in x and degree five in y.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Isolating the T ∗ term in (2.61) gives
ǫ∆TyT
∗ = C − Tinputǫy + (∆RR∗ +Rinput)x . (2.105)
Replacing T ∗ by the expression from Lemma 1, multiplying both sides of (2.105) by
(θ + kγR∗)x+ Tinput and using the definition of M(x, y) from (2.103), results in
ǫ∆Tkbx
2y = (M +∆RR
∗x)
(
(θ + kγR∗)x+ Tinput
)
. (2.106)
Applying Lemma 2 to obtain an expression for R∗ and multiplying both sides of (2.106)
by L2(y) from (2.103), we get
ǫ∆Tkbx
2yL2 = (ML+∆Rkˆaxy
2)
(
(θL+ kγkˆay2)x+ TinputL
)
. (2.107)
Using the definitions of J(x, y), M1(x, y), Q(x, y) and θ from (2.103), we obtain
bxJL =M1
(
(k(1 + b)−∆T )xL+Q
)
. (2.108)
Moving the terms with b to the left side of the equation, we get
bxJL− bkxLM1 =
(
(k −∆T )xL+Q
)
M1 . (2.109)
Solving the last expression for b gives us (2.104).

From Theorem 4, we are able to build the antigen function that relates exactly the
concentration of T cells x = T + T ∗ and the concentration of Tregs y = R + R∗ with
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the level of the antigenic stimulation of T cells b. Let
C(x, y) = ((ǫdT − dR)− β(1− ǫ)(x+ y)) xy
L(y) = λy +Rinput
M(x, y) = C − ǫTinputy +Rinputx
D0(x, y) = M
2 + ǫ(θx+ Tinput)yM − ǫ2k∆T bx2y2
D1(x, y) = 2∆RxM + ǫγkxyM + ǫ∆R(θx+ Tinput)xy
D2(x, y) =
(
∆R + ǫγky
)
x2
D3(y) = 4akˆ∆Ry
2
D4(x, y) = ǫkx− ǫ2k∆Tx2y2
D5(x, y) = 2M
2 + ǫ((k −∆T )x+ Tinput)yM
D6(x, y) = ǫk∆Rx
2y
D7(x, y) = (2∆R + ǫγky)xM + ǫ∆R((k −∆T )x+ Tinput)xy , (2.110)
and
A1(x, y) = −4D3
A2(y) = −16L
A3 = 16
A4(x, y) = 4D2D3L
A5(x, y) = 8(2L
2 +D3)D2
A6(x, y) = D
2
2D
2
3 . (2.111)
Let
B0(x, y) = A1D
2
7 + A2D5D7 + A3D
2
5 + A4D7 + A5D5 + A6
B1(x, y) = 2A1D6D7 + A2D4D7 + A2D5D6 + 2A3D4D5 + A4D6 + A5D4
B2(x, y) = A1D
2
6 + A2D4D6 + A3D
2
4 . (2.112)
Theorem 6. Let B0(x, y), B1(x, y) and B2(x, y) be defined as above. Let b(x, y) be the
antigen function, and let x(y) (or y(x)) be as in Theorem 4. When the system is at
equilibrium (stable or unstable), the exact level of the antigenic stimulation b of T cells
is given by the zeros of:
B2b
2 + B1b+ B0 = 0 . (2.113)
Conversely, given an antigenic stimulation level b of T cells, the concentration x of T
cells and the concentration y of Tregs are zeros of polynomials that can be explicitly
constructed, of degree eight in x and y.
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Proof of Theorem 6:
Using M(x, y) from (2.110) in equation (2.61) we have
M +∆RxR
∗ = ǫ∆TyT
∗ . (2.114)
We must take the positive square root (T ∗ > 0) of (2.17), placing in (2.114),
M +∆RxR
∗ = ǫ∆Ty
(−H +√H2 + 4k∆T bx2
2∆T
)
. (2.115)
Multiplying by 2 and isolating the square root, we have that
2M + 2∆RxR
∗ + ǫyH = ǫy
√
H2 + 4k∆T bx2 . (2.116)
Squaring both terms gives
4M2 + 8∆RxMR
∗ + 4ǫyHM + 4∆2Rx
2R∗2
+4ǫ∆RxyHMR
∗ + ǫ2y2H2 = ǫ2y2(H2 + 4k∆T bx
2) . (2.117)
Simplifying the ǫ2y2H2 terms, dividing by 4 and using the definition of H(x,R∗) =
(θ + γkR∗)x+ Tinput we obtain
M2 + 2∆RxMR
∗ + ǫy(θx+ γkxR∗ + Tinput)M +∆
2
Rx
2R∗2
+ǫ∆Rxy(θx+ γkxR
∗ + Tinput)MR
∗ = ǫ2k∆T bx
2y2 . (2.118)
Reorganizing the terms as a polynomial in R∗2 gives
∆R
(
∆R + ǫγky
)
x2R∗2
+
(
2∆RM + ǫγkyM + ǫ∆R(θx+ Tinput)y
)
xR∗
+M2 + ǫ(θx+ Tinput)yM − ǫ2k∆T bx2y2 = 0 . (2.119)
Using the definitions of Di from (2.110) we have
∆RD2R
∗2 +D1R
∗ +D0 = 0 . (2.120)
Since θ = k(1+ b)−∆T , decomposing D0(x, y) from (2.110), to present the terms with
b yields
D0(x, y) = M
2 + ǫ((k(1 + b)−∆T )x+ Tinput)yM − ǫ2k∆T bx2y2 . (2.121)
Isolating the terms in b,
D0(x, y) = (ǫkx− ǫ2k∆Tx2y2)b+M2 + ǫ((k −∆T )x+ Tinput)yM . (2.122)
Using the definitions of D4(x, y) and D5(x, y) from (2.110) we can write
D0(x, y) = D4b+D5 . (2.123)
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For D1(x, y) we will also decompose it in terms with and without b:
D1(x, y) = (2∆R + ǫγky)xM
+ǫ∆R((k(1 + b)−∆T )x+ Tinput)xy . (2.124)
Again, isolating the terms in b we obtain
D1(x, y) = ǫk∆Rx
2yb
+(2∆R + ǫγky)xM + ǫ∆R((k −∆T )x+ Tinput)xy . (2.125)
Using the definitions of D6(x, y) and D7(x, y) from (2.110) we have
D1(x, y) = D6b+D7 . (2.126)
The term D2(x, y) does not have any term with b. Applying the definition of D3(x, y)
in the positive root (R∗ > 0) of (2.52),
R∗ =
−L+√L2 +D3
2∆R
. (2.127)
Using the expression above, we can compute 4∆2RR
∗2, resulting in
4∆2RR
∗2 = L2 − 2L
√
L2 +D3 + L
2 +D3
= 2L2 +D3 − 2L
√
L2 +D3 . (2.128)
Multiplying equation (2.120) by 4∆R and using the formulas for R
∗ (2.127) and 4∆2RR
∗2
(2.128) we have that
D2
(
2L2 +D3 − 2L
√
L2 +D3
)
+ 2D1(−L+
√
L2 +D3) + 4D0 = 0 . (2.129)
Isolating the terms with the square root
(2L2 +D3)D2 − 2LD1 + 4D0 = 2(D2L−D1)
√
L2 +D3 . (2.130)
Squaring both terms
(2L2 +D3)
2D22 − 4(2L2 +D3)D1D2L
+8(2L2 +D3)D0D2 + 4D
2
1L
2 − 16D0D1L+ 16D20
= 4(D2L−D1)2(L2 +D3) . (2.131)
Expanding the products we obtain
(4L4 + 4L2D3 +D
2
3)D
2
2 − 4(2L2 +D3)D1D2L
+8(2L2 +D3)D0D2 + 4D
2
1L
2 − 16D0D1L+ 16D20
= 4(D22L
2 − 2D1D2L+D21)(L2 +D3) . (2.132)
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We note that both sides have a term 4D22L
2(L2 +D3) and a term 4D
2
1L
2. Simplifying
them and organizing the terms in D0(x, y) and D1(x, y) we have
−4D3D21
−16D0D1L
+16D20
+4D2D3LD1
+8(2L2 +D3)D2D0
+D22D
2
3 = 0 . (2.133)
Using the definitions of Ai in (2.111) we can write
A1D
2
1 + A2D0D1 + A3D
2
0 + A4D1 + A5D0 + A6 = 0 . (2.134)
Using (2.123) and (2.126), we have that
A1(D6b+D7)
2 + A2(D4b+D5)(D6b+D7)
+A3(D4b+D5)
2 + A4(D6b+D7)
+A5(D4b+D5) + A6 = 0 . (2.135)
Expanding the products,
A1(D
2
6b
2 + 2D6D7b+D
2
7) + A2(D4D6b
2 +D4D7b+D5D6b+D5D7)
+A3(D
2
4b
2 + 2D4D5b+D
2
5) + A4(D6b+D7)
+A5(D4b+D5) + A6 = 0 . (2.136)
Organizing the terms as a quadratic polynomial in b gives
(
A1D
2
6 + A2D4D6 + A3D
2
4
)
b2
+
(
2A1D6D7 + A2D4D7 + A2D5D6 + 2A3D4D5 + A4D6 + A5D4
)
b
+A1D
2
7 + A2D5D7 + A3D
2
5 + A4D7 + A5D5 + A6 = 0 . (2.137)
Using the definitions of Bi from (2.112) we have equation (2.113).

2.3.3 Effect of the asymmetry parameters
For the default values of our parameters, the antigen function determines that the
relation between the concentration x of T cells and the antigenic stimulation b of T
cells is an hysteresis. The asymmetry affects the bistability region of the hysteresis, the
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region bounded between the two catastrophe points bL and bH by moving the thresholds
bL and bH , changing the distance between them and by merging them, resulting in a
cusp bifurcation point, where the hysteresis unfolds. We also observe an effect in the
concentration of Tregs when the parameters below are changed.
The hysteresis changes when we increase the relation dT∗
dT
between the death rates
of active and inactive T cells. We observe a decrease in the concentration of Tregs
when the relation dT∗
dT
increase (see Figure 2.7). Furthermore, the distance between the
thresholds bL and bH reduces and for high values of
dT∗
dT
≈ 0.977 . . . we observe the
unfold of the hysteresis (see Figures 2.8 and 2.9).
A dramatic effect is observed when we increase the relation dR
dT
between the death rates
of Tregs and T cells. The distance between the thresholds bL and bH is very large for low
values of dR
dT
. The concentration of Tregs is negatively correlated with dR
dT
(see Figure
2.10). When this relation is increased, the distance between bL and bH is reduced and
the hysteresis is unfold for bL and
dR
dT
≈ 1.23 . . . (see Figures 2.11 and 2.12).
The concentration of Tregs are lower for large values of this parameter (see Figure 2.13).
Higher values of the ratio dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
between the death rates of active and inactive Tregs
and active and inactive T cells give smaller distances between the thresholds bL and
bH and an unfold of the hysteresis arises for
dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
≈ 7.94 . . . (see Figures 2.14 and
2.15).
The concentration of Tregs visibly decreases when
Rinput
Tinput
is decreased (see Figure 2.16).
When we decrease towards 0.1, the relation
Rinput
Tinput
between the input Tregs and the input
T cells, the hysteresis shrinks but does not unfold (see Figure 2.17). Nevertheless, for
Rinput
Tinput
≈ 0.398 . . . the loop in the concentration y of Tregs observed for higher values
of
Rinput
Tinput
vanishes (see Figure 2.18).
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Figure 2.7: Relation between the concentration of T cells x = T+T ∗, the concentration
of Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation dT∗
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: x = T + T ∗; ”away axis”: dT∗
dT
; vertical axis: y = R + R∗. Low
values of b are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dT∗
dT
= 0.01 (dashes), 0.1
(solid), and 2.5 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗
of T cells, and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R + R∗ of Tregs. The
colors indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x
from Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.8: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of T
cells x = T + T ∗ and the relation dT∗
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: dT∗
dT
; vertical axis: x = T + T ∗. Low values of
y = R +R∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dT∗
dT
= 0.01 (dashes), 0.1
(solid), and 2.5 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T
cells, and the vertical axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗ of T cells. The colors
indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from
Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.9: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of
Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation dT∗
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: dT∗
dT
; vertical axis: y = R + R∗. Low values of
x = T + T ∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dT∗
dT
= 0.01 (dashes), 0.1
(solid), and 2.5 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T cells
and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R+R∗ of Tregs. The colors indicate
when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.10: Relation between the concentration of T cells x = T+T ∗, the concentration
of Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation dR
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: x = T + T ∗; ”away axis”: dR
dT
; vertical axis: y = R + R∗. Low
values of b are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dR
dT
= 0.1 (dashes), 1 (solid),
and 10 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗ of T
cells, and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R + R∗ of Tregs. The colors
indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from
Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.11: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of
T cells x = T + T ∗ and the relation dR
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: dR
dT
; vertical axis: x = T + T ∗. Low values of
y = R +R∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dR
dT
= 0.1 (dashes), 1 (solid),
and 10 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T cells, and
the vertical axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗ of T cells. The colors indicate
when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.12: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of
Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation dR
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: dR
dT
; vertical axis: y = R + R∗. Low values of
x = T + T ∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dR
dT
= 0.1 (dashes), 1 (solid),
and 10 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the
vertical axis is the total concentration y = R +R∗ of Tregs. The colors indicate when
it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.13: Relation between the concentration of T cells x = T+T ∗, the concentration
of Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: x = T + T ∗; ”away axis”: dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
; vertical axis: y = R+R∗. Low
values of b are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dR∗
dR
/
d∗T
dT
= 0.1 (dashes), 1
(solid), and 10 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗
of T cells, and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R + R∗ of Tregs. The
colors indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x
from Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.14: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of
T cells x = T + T ∗ and the relation dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
; vertical axis: x = T + T ∗. Low values of
y = R +R∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dR∗
dR
/
d∗T
dT
= 0.1 (dashes), 1
(solid), and 10 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T cells,
and the vertical axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗ of T cells. The colors
indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from
Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.15: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of
Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”: dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
; vertical axis: y = R + R∗. Low values of
x = T + T ∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
= 0.1 (dashes), 1
(solid), and 10 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T cells
and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R+R∗ of Tregs. The colors indicate
when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.16: Relation between the concentration of T cells x = T+T ∗, the concentration
of Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation
Rinput
Tinput
.
A: Horizontal axis: x = T + T ∗; ”away axis”:
Rinput
Tinput
; vertical axis: y = R + R∗. Low
values of b are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for
Rinput
Tinput
= 0.1 (dashes), 1
(solid), and 16 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗
of T cells, and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R + R∗ of Tregs. The
colors indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x
from Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.17: Relation between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration
of T cells x = T + T ∗ and the relation
Rinput
Tinput
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”:
Rinput
Tinput
; vertical axis: x = T + T ∗. Low values of
y = R +R∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for
Rinput
Tinput
= 0.1 (dashes), 1
(solid), and 16 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T cells,
and the vertical axis is the total concentration x = T + T ∗ of T cells. The colors
indicate when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from
Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.18: Relation between antigenic stimulation b of T cells, the concentration of
Tregs y = R +R∗ and the relation
Rinput
Tinput
.
A: Horizontal axis: b; ”away axis”:
Rinput
Tinput
; vertical axis: y = R + R∗. Low values of
x = T + T ∗ are darker and higher values are lighter.
B: Cross sections of the equilibria manifold in figure A for
Rinput
Tinput
= 0.1 (dashes), 1
(solid), and 16 (dash-dot). The horizontal axis is the antigenic stimulation b of T cells
and the vertical axis is the total concentration y = R+R∗ of Tregs. The colors indicate
when it is plotted the smallest root (green) or largest root (blue) of x from Theorem 3.
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2.3.4 Tuning between the antigenic stimuli
The antigen presenting cells (APC), such as dendritic cells, present both self and non
self antigens Leo´n et al. (2004). Therefore, there is a positive correlation between the
levels of antigen stimulation a of the Tregs and the levels of antigen stimulation bˆ of
the T cells. For simplicity, we study a linear tuning between these stimuli in the form:
a(bˆ) = a0 +mbˆ, (2.138)
with a0 as in Burroughs et al. (2011b) and m ≥ 0. If the levels of antigenic stimulation
a of Tregs and the levels of antigen stimulation bˆ of the T cells are independent, the
slope m is equal to zero.
Using this linear tuning, we can expand the result from Theorem 5. Let
λˆ = kˆ(1 + a0)−∆R
λ(bˆ) = λˆ+ kˆmbˆ
C(x, y) = ((ǫdT − dR)− β(1− ǫ)(x+ y)) xy
Lˆ(y) = λˆy +Rinput
L˜(y) = kˆmy
L(y, bˆ) = Lˆ+ L˜bˆ
Jˆ(x, y) = ǫ∆TkxyLˆ
J˜(x, y) = ǫ∆Tkkˆmxy
2
J(x, y, bˆ) = Jˆ + J˜ bˆ
M(x, y) = C − Tinputǫy +Rinputx
Mˆ1(x, y) = MLˆ+∆Ra0kˆxy
2
M˜1(x, y) = (M +∆Rxy) kˆmy
M1(x, y, bˆ) = Mˆ1 + M˜1bˆ
M2(x) = (k −∆T )x
Qˆ(x, y) = a0kkˆγxy
2 + TinputLˆ
Q˜(x, y) = (kγxy + Tinput) kˆmy
Q(x, y) = Qˆ+ Q˜bˆ
Q0(x, y) = (M2Lˆ+ Qˆ)Mˆ1
Q1(x, y) = (Jˆ − kMˆ1)xLˆ− ((M2Lˆ+ Qˆ)M˜1 + (M2L˜+ Q˜)Mˆ1)
Q2(x, y) = ((Jˆ − kMˆ1)L˜+ (J˜ − kM˜1)Lˆ)x− (M2L˜+ Q˜)M˜1
Q3(x, y) = (J˜ − kM˜1)xL˜ . (2.139)
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Theorem 7. Let bˆ(x, y) be the tuned antigen function, let a(bˆ) = a0+mbˆ and let x(y)
(or y(x)) be as in Theorem 3. The approximate level of antigenic stimulation bˆ of T
cells is a zero of the third degree polynomial bˆ(x, y), when the system is at equilibrium
(stable or unstable).
Q3bˆ
3 +Q2bˆ
2 +Q1bˆ+Q0 = 0 . (2.140)
Conversely, given an antigenic stimulation level bˆ of T cells, the approximate concentra-
tion x of T cells and the approximate concentration y of Tregs are zeros of polynomials
that can be explicitly constructed of degree three in x and degree five in y.
Note that Theorem 5 can be obtained as a corollary of Theorem 7 by assuming that
the antigenic stimuli a and bˆ are independent, i.e. by setting m = 0.
Proof of Theorem 7:
The equalities in (2.139) are obtained by applying (2.138) to equations (2.103). From
equation (2.109), using the definition of M2(x) we have that
(J − kM1)xLbˆ = (M2L+Q)M1 . (2.141)
Replacing the definitions in (2.139) on the equation above we obtain
(Jˆ + J˜ bˆ− k(Mˆ1 + M˜1bˆ))x(Lˆ+ L˜bˆ)bˆ
= (M2(Lˆ+ L˜bˆ) + (Qˆ+ Q˜bˆ))(Mˆ1 + M˜1bˆ) . (2.142)
Expanding the products to obtain polynomials in bˆ, we get
(J˜ − kM˜1)xL˜bˆ3
+((Jˆ − kMˆ1)L˜+ (J˜ − kM˜1)Lˆ)xbˆ2
+(Jˆ − kMˆ1)xLˆbˆ
= (M2L˜+ Q˜)M˜1bˆ
2
+((M2Lˆ+ Qˆ)M˜1 + (M2L˜+ Q˜)Mˆ1)bˆ
+(M2Lˆ+ Qˆ)Mˆ1 . (2.143)
Reordering the terms of the previous expression and using the definitions of Qi(x, y)
we obtain (2.140).

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We are also able to obtain exact result when considering the tuning in (2.138). Let
Bˆ0(x, y) = A1D
2
7 − 16D5D7L+ A3D25 + 4D2D3D7Lˆ+ A5D5 + A6
B˜0(x, y) = −16kˆmyD5D7 + 4kˆmyD2D3D7
Bˆ1(x, y) = 2A1D6D7 − 16(D4D7 +D5D6)Lˆ
+2A3D4D5 + 4D2D3D6Lˆ+ A5D4
B˜1(x, y) = −16kˆmy(D4D7 +D5D6) + kˆmyD2D3D6
Bˆ2(x, y) = A1D
2
6 − 16D4D6Lˆ+ A3D24
B˜2(x, y) = −16kˆmyD4D6 . (2.144)
Theorem 8. Let bˆ(x, y) be the tuned antigen function, let a(bˆ) = a0+mbˆ and let x(y)
(or y(x)) be as in Theorem 4. The exact level of antigenic stimulation bˆ of T cells is
a zero of the third degree polynomial bˆ(x, y), when the system is at equilibrium (stable
or unstable).
B˜2bˆ
3 + (Bˆ2 + B˜1)bˆ
2 + (Bˆ1 + B˜0)bˆ+ Bˆ0 = 0 . (2.145)
Conversely, given an antigenic stimulation level bˆ of T cells, the exact concentration
x of T cells and the exact concentration y of Tregs are zeros of polynomials of degree
eight in x and y that can be explicitly constructed.
Note that Theorem 6 can be obtained as a corollary of Theorem 8 by assuming that
the antigenic stimuli a and bˆ are independent, i.e. by setting m = 0.
Proof of Theorem 8:
In (2.111) the only terms that contain a are
A2(y) = −16L
A4(x, y) = 4D2D3L . (2.146)
Hence, replacing these in Bi(x, y), from equations (2.112), we have that
B0(x, y) = A1D
2
7 − 16D5D7L+ A3D25 + 4D2D3D7L+ A5D5 + A6
B1(x, y) = 2A1D6D7 − 16(D4D7 +D5D6)L
+2A3D4D5 + 4D2D3D6L+ A5D4
B2(x, y) = A1D
2
6 − 16D4D6L+ A3D24 . (2.147)
Using the definition of L(y) from (2.139) and the formulas for Bˆi(x, y) and B˜i(x, y)
from (2.144), we get
B0(x, y) = Bˆ0 + B˜0bˆ
B1(x, y) = Bˆ1 + B˜1bˆ
B2(x, y) = Bˆ2 + B˜2bˆ . (2.148)
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Therefore equation (2.113) becomes
(Bˆ2 + B˜2bˆ)bˆ
2 + (Bˆ1 + B˜1bˆ) + (Bˆ0 + B˜0bˆ) = 0 . (2.149)
Organizing the terms as a polynomial in bˆ we obtain Theorem 8.

2.4 Discussion
In this section, we examined a mechanism proposed in Burroughs et al. (2006), also
presented in Burroughs et al. (2008, 2011a,b) and reviewed in Pinto et al. (2010) of
Treg control of immune responses through regulation of cytokine dependent T cell
proliferation. In particular, we studied here the asymmetry introduced in Burroughs
et al. (2011b).
When we analyse the model with asymmetry in the absence of Tregs we already observe
an hysteresis, similar to the result presented in Burroughs et al. (2006). This is shown
by the approximate formula in Theorem 1 and the exact formula in the Theorem 2.
In Theorems 3 and 4, we determine analytic formulas that describe approximately
and exactly, respectively, the fine balance between Regulatory T cells and T cells, in
particular at controlled and immune response equilibrium states. We observe that,
for the parameter values chosen, the maximum concentration of Tregs is found for
concentrations of T cells around 104−105. At these values, there is enough secretion of
IL-2 cytokine by T cells to sustain a larger population of Tregs and the balance between
growth and death is favourable to the Tregs. For lower concentrations of T cells, there
is not enough cytokine to sustain larger populations of Tregs; for higher concentrations
of T cells the growth rate of Tregs is insufficient to overcome the increase in the fas-fasL
death rates due to the increase in the population of the T cells.
In Theorems 5 and 6, we determine explicit formulas that relate approximately and
exactly, respectively, the antigenic stimulation of T cells, the concentration of T cells
and the concentration of Tregs. For our parameter values, we observe that the relation
between the antigenic stimulation of T cells and the concentration of T cells is an
hysteresis. There is a controlled state for antigenic stimulations b of T cells below
bL, an immune response state for antigenic stimulations b of T cells above bH and a
bistability region for b between bL and bH , as found in the symmetric case in Burroughs
et al. (2006, 2008). By changing some of the parameters, it is possible to reach a cusp
bifurcation point, where a drastic change in the dynamical behavior occurs: the unfold
of the hysteresis. The hysteresis is unfolded when the homeostatic concentration of T
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cells Thom is high enough to override the control structure constituted by the thresholds
bL and bH . This happens when Thom rises to values only attained before when the
antigenic stimulation of T cells was close to bL. The unfold of the hysteresis is already
present in model with symmetry, see Burroughs et al. (2006, 2008), here we observe
that it unfolds for large values of dR
dT
, dT∗
dT
and dR∗
dR
/dT∗
dT
. For low values of
Rinput
Tinput
the
hysteresis shrinks but does not unfold.
The correlation between the antigenic stimulation b of T cells and the antigenic stim-
ulation a of Tregs was modeled by the linear relation from Burroughs et al. (2011b)
to simulate the effect of the antigen presenting cells. In Theorems 7 and 8 we present
explicit formulas that relate the approximate and exact relation between the antigenic
stimulation of T cells with the concentration of Tregs y and the concentration of T
cells x. These formulas are polynomials of third order in b. By contrast, the formulas
from Theorems 5 and 6, are linear and quadratic in b, respectively. Therefore, when
we consider this tuning it may be possible to find three solutions where only one or
two solutions would be found. Therefore, Theorems 7 and 8 are able to explain the
appearance of an isola and the transcritical bifurcation that occurs in Burroughs et al.
(2011b).
To conclude, in this section we analysed the model considering an asymmetry in the
death rates, thus contributing to depthen the understanding of the immune response
by T cells. We have obtained approximate formulas for the equilibria (stable or
unstable); afterwards, we improved these results to attain exact formulas. These
analytic formulas relate the concentration of T cells, the concentration of Tregs and
the antigenic stimulation of T cells without and with the presence of a tuning between
the antigenic stimuli.
Chapter 3
Optimal investments in Cournot
competition
3.1 Introduction
We consider a Cournot competition model Cournot (1897), where two firms invest
in R&D projects to reduce their production costs Ferreira et al. (2008); Pinto et al.
(2008). This competition is modeled, as usual, by a two stages game see d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988). In the first subgame, two firms choose, simultaneously, the
R&D investment strategies to reduce their initial production costs and in the second
subgame, the two firms are involved in a Cournot competition with production costs
equal to the reduced cost obtained in the previous stage. We find the strategic optimal
equilibra for the two stages game and study the economical impacts resulting from
having distinct equilibria, see Brander and Spencer (1983); Ruff (1997). As it is well
known, the second subgame, consisting of a Cournot competition, has a unique Nash
equilibrium. For the first subgame, consisting of an R&D investment program there
are at most three distinct types of strategic optimal investment equilibria: (i) a Nash
equilibrium where both firms invest, see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988); (ii) a
Nash equilibrium where firm F1 invests and firm F2 does not; (iii) a Nash equilibrium
where firm F2 invests and firm F1 does not. We consider a competitive investment
region C where both firms invest, a single investment region S1 for firm F1 where
just firm F1 invests, and a single investment region S2 for firm F2 where just firm
F2 invests. We observe that these regions can have non-empty intersections, i.e. the
strategic optimal investment equilibrium might not be unique.
As in Ferreira et al. (2009, 2010), we construct a discrete time evolution on the pro-
duction costs that we call (myopic optimal) discrete R&D dynamics, as follows: given
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a pair of production costs (c1(n), c2(n)), at time n, each strategic optimal investment
equilibrium (v1(n), v2(n)) determines a new pair of production costs (c1(n+ 1), c2(n+
1)), at time n+ 1. The discrete R&D dynamics in the production costs (c1(n), c2(n)),
determines discrete R&D dynamics in the strategic optimal investment equilibrium
(v1(n), v2(n)) and in the profits (π1(n), π2(n)) of the firms. We observe that the map
from the production costs at time n to the production costs at time n+1 might be multi-
valued. Furthermore, we construct a (myopic optimal) continuous R&D dynamics on
the investments (v1(t), v2(t)) where each firm chooses its marginal rate of investment
proportional to the marginal rate of the profit with respect to its investment. The
continuous R&D dynamics in the investments (v1(t), v2(t)) determines continuous R&D
dynamics in the production costs (c1(t), c2(t)) and in the profits (π1(t), π2(t)) of the
firms. The multi-valued indeterminacy in the discrete R&D dynamics is resolved in
the continuous R&D dynamics by knowing the initial investments of both firms. The
continuous R&D dynamics show the existence of evolutions in the production costs that
are omitted in the discrete R&D dynamics. Furthermore we show for the continuous
R&D dynamics, that the economic success or failure of a firm can be very sensitive to
the initial R&D investment strategies of that firm.
3.2 R&D investments on costs
The Cournot competition with R&D investment programs consists of two subgames in
one period of time, see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988); Ferreira et al. (2009).
The first subgame is an R&D investment program, where both firms have initial
production costs and choose, simultaneously, their R&D investment strategies to obtain
new production costs. The second subgame is a typical Cournot duopoly competition
with production costs equal to the reduced cost determined in the previous stage.
3.2.1 The R&D program
We consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, F1 and F2, each
one producing a differentiated good. Let qi be the quantity produced by the firm Fi.
In the region of quantity space where prices are positive, we assume that the inverse
demands are linear and the price pi of the good produced by the firm Fi is given by
pi = αi − βiqi − γqj,
where αi, βi > 0. Furthermore, we assume that the goods are substitutes, i.e. γ > 0
(see Singh and Vives (1984)).
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The firm Fi invests an amount vi in an R&D program, studied in d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988); Qiu (1997) ai : [0, (ci/λi−θivj)2]→ [0, ci] that reduces its production
cost to a new production cost ai given by
ai(vi) = ci − λi
√
vi + θivj. (3.1)
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Figure 3.1: R&D investment function, whereλi > 0 is a “measure“of the efficiency of
the R&D program and 0 < θ < 1 is the spillover effect.
All the results presented hold in an open region of parameters (λi, αi, βi, γi, θi, θj)
containing the point (0.2, 10, 0.013, 0.013, 0, 0).
3.2.2 Optimal output levels
The profit πi(qi, qj) of firm Fi is given by:
πi(qi, qj) = qi (αi − βiqi − γqj − ai)− vi, (3.2)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.
The Nash equilibrium output level (q∗1, q
∗
2) is given by:
q∗i =


0, if Ri ≤ 0
Ri, if 0 < Ri <
αj−aj
γ
αi−ai
2βi
, if Ri ≥ αj−ajγ
, (3.3)
where
Ri =
2βjαi − γαj − 2βjai + γaj
4βiβj − γ2 ,
with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, see Ferreira et al. (2009, 2010). Hence, (i) if Ri ≤ 0,
the firm Fj is at its monopoly output level; (ii) if Ri ≥ (αj − aj)/γ, the firm Fi is at
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its monopoly output level; and (iii) if 0 < Ri < (αj − aj)/γ, both firms have positive
optimal output levels and so firms are facing a duopoly competition. From now on we
assume that both firms choose their Nash equilibrium outputs (q∗1, q
∗
2). Thus, firm Fi
has profit π∗i (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) given by:
π∗i (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) =


−vi, if Ri ≤ 0
βiR
2
i − vi, if 0 < Ri < αj−ajγ
(αi−ai)
2
4βi
− vi, if Ri ≥ αj−ajγ
. (3.4)
3.2.3 New Production costs
Given initial production costs c1 and c2, the sets Ai of new production costs for firms
F1 and F2 are given by:
Ai = Ai(c1, c2) = [0, ci],
for i ∈ {1, 2}. The R&D cost reduction investment programs a1 and a2 of the firms
determine a bijection between the investment region R+0 × R+0 of both firms and the
new production costs region A1 × A2 given by the map
a = (a1, a2) : R
+
0 × R+0 −→ A1 × A2
(v1, v2) 7−→ (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)),
where
ai(v1, v2) = ai(v1, v2; c1, c2) = ci − λi
√
vi + θivj.
We denote the inverse map of a by ω = (ω1, ω2) : a
(
R
+
0 × R+0
)→ R+0 × R+0
ωi(ai, aj) =
((
(ci − ai)
λi
)2
− θi
(
(cj − aj)
λj
)2)
/(1− θiθj).
The new production costs region can be decomposed, at most, in three disconnected
economical regions characterized by the optimal output level of the firms:
Mi The monopoly region Mi of firm Fi characterized by the optimal output level of
firm Fi being the monopoly output and consequently the optimal output level of
firm Fj is zero;
D The duopoly region D characterized by the optimal output levels of both firms
being non-zero and consequently below their monopoly output levels.
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Figure 3.2: New production costs region. Monopoly, M1, M2 and duopoly regions, D .
The boundary lMi between the duopoly region D and the monopoly region Mi is
characterized as follows: lM1 is the segment line a2 = γ(a1 − α1)/2β1 + α2 and lM2
is the segment line a2 = 2β2(a1 − α1)/γ + α2.
Using the Nash output levels for the new production costs (a1, a2), the profit function
πi : Ai × Aj → R of firm Fi is a piecewise smooth continuous function given by:
πi(a1, a2) =


πi,M , if (a1, a2) ∈Mi
πi,D, if (a1, a2) ∈ D
−ωi(a1, a2), if (a1, a2) ∈Mj
,
where:
πi,M = πi,M(a1, a2; c1, c2) =
(α− ai)2
4β
− ωi(a1, a2)
and
πi,D = πi,D(a1, a2; c1, c2) =
β (2β(α− ai)− γ(α− aj))2
(4β2 − γ2)2 − ωi(a1, a2).
3.2.4 Optimal R&D investment response functions
The optimal investment response function V1(v2) = V1(v2; c1, c2) of firm F1 to a given
investment v2 of firm F2, is given by:
V1(v2) = argmax
v1
π1(a1(v1), a2(v2)).
We will study separately the cases where the new production costs belong to (i) the
monopoly region M1; (ii) the duopoly region D; (iii) the monopoly region M2.
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Let FM1(v2) be the set of v1 ∈ R+0 such that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ lM1 . Let ZM1(v2)
be the set of solutions v1 ∈ R+0 of the following equation
∂π1,M1
∂v1
= 0
satisfying the restriction (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ M1. We note that FM1(v2) and
ZM1(v2) can be empty. The strategic optimal response v1(v2) of firm F1 in M1 is
given by:
v1(v2) = argmax
v1∈ZM1 (v2)∪FM1 (v2)
π1,M1(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
We have the similar definitions for firm F2.
Lemma 3. The set ZMi(vj) has a unique element
vi = min
{(
λi(αi − ci)
4βi − λ2i
)2
,
(
ci
λi
)2}
if (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈Mi; otherwise, ZMi(vj) = ∅.
Proof: We have
∂πi,M
∂ai
=
(ai − αi)
2βi
,
∂ai
∂vi
= − λi
2
√
vi
,
∂πi
∂vi
= −1.
Thus,
dπi,M
dvi
=
(αi − ai)
2βi
λi
2
√
vi
− 1 = λi(αi − ai)
4βi
√
vi
− 1.
Hence, dπi,M/dvi = 0 iff
vi =
(
λi(αi − ci)
4βi − λ2i
)2
.

Let ZD1(v2) be the set of zeros v1 of the following polynomial
∂π1,D
∂v1
= 0
satisfying the restriction (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D. We note that the set ZD1(v2) can
be empty. The strategic optimal response v1(v2) of firm F1 in D is given by:
v1(v2) = argmax
v1∈ZD(v2)∪FM1 (v2)
π1,D(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)).
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We have the similar definitions for firm F2.
Let Wi =
√
vi + θivj, Oi = −4βiβj/(4βiβj − γ2)2,
f1(Wi,Wj) = W
2
j (2βjγλiλjOi) +WiWj
(−4β2jλ2iOi − 4βj)+
+ Wj
(
2βjγOi(αj − cj)− 4Oiβ2j (αi − ci)
)
,
and
f2(Wi,Wj) = W
2
i (2Oiγλiλjβj) +WiWj
(−Oiγ2λ2j)+
+ Wi(2Oiγβjλj(αi − ci)−Oiγ2λj(αj − cj)).
Lemma 4. ZDi(vj) is the set of all zeros vi ∈ [0, (ci/λi − θivj)2] of the polynomial
f1(Wi,Wj) + θjf2(Wi,Wj) = 0 (3.5)
with the property that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D.
Proof: We have ∂ai/∂vi = −λi/(2Wi), ∂aj/∂vi = −(λjθj)/(2Wj), ∂πi,D/∂vi = −1,
∂πi,D
∂ai
= −4βiβj (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
= 2Oiβj(αi − ci) + 2βjλiOiWi − γOi(αj − cj)− γλjOiWj
and
∂πi,D
∂aj
=
2βiγ (2βj(αi − ai) + γ(aj − αj))
(4βiβj − γ2)2
= −Oiγ(αi − ci)−OiγλiWi + Oiγ
2
2βj
(αj − cj) + Oiγ
2λj
2βj
Wj.
Using the chain rule,
dπi,D
dvi
= (2Oiβj(αi − ci) + 2βjλiOiWi − γOi(αj − cj)− γλjOiWj)
(
− λi
2Wi
)
+
+
(
−Oiγ(αi − ci)−OiγλiWi + Oiγ
2
2βj
(αj − cj) + Oiγ
2λj
2βj
Wj
)(
−λjθj
2Wj
)
− 1.
Hence, dπi,D/dvi = 0 iff
W 2j (2βjγλiλjOi) +WiWj
(−4β2jλ2iOi − 4βj)+
+ Wj
(
2βjγOi(αj − cj)− 4Oiβ2j (αi − ci)
)
+
+ θj(W
2
i (2Oiγλiλjβj) +WiWj
(−Oiγ2λ2j)+
+ Wi(2Oiγβjλj(αi − ci)−Oiγ2λj(αj − cj)) = 0.
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
The firm Fi uses a patent if θj = 0. Let Wi =
√
vi.
Lemma 5. Suppose that both firms use patents. ZDi(vj) is the set of all zeros vi ∈
[0, (ci/λi)
2] of the polynomial
W 2j (2βjγλiλjOi) +WiWj
(−4β2jλ2iOi − 4βj)+ (3.6)
+ Wj
(
2βjγOi(αj − cj)− 4Oiβ2j (αi − ci)
)
= 0
with the property that (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)) ∈ D.
Proof: From (3.5), making θi = θj = 0 we get (3.6).

We note that the strategic optimal response vi(vj) of firm Fi with (a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2) ∈
Mj is zero, i.e. not investing.
Theorem 9. The strategic optimal investment response function Vi : R
+
0 → R+0 of firm
Fi is computed by
Vi(vj) = arg max
vi∈R(vj)
πi(a1(v1, v2), a2(v1, v2)),
where R(vj) = ZMi(vj) ∪ FMi(vj) ∪ ZDi(vj) ∪ {0, (ci/λi − θivj)2}.
Theorem 9 gives an explicit computational algorithm to find the strategic optimal
investment response function Vi : R
+
0 → R+0 that we will use in all the examples
discussed in this paper: Using lM1 and lM2 , we know the domains D, M1 and M2 and
so the set FMi(vj). Using Lemma 3, we find ZMi(vj). We find the zeros vi of (3.5), and
using lM1 and lM2 , we check if the zeros vi determine pairs (v1, v2) of investments in
D. Applying Lemma 4, ZDi(vj) is the set of these zeros vi whose corresponding pairs
(v1, v2) ∈ D. Finally, comparing the profit values for the investments in ZMi(vj) ∪
FMi(vj) ∪ ZDi(vj) ∪ {0}, we determine the strategic optimal investment vi for firm Fi
not necessarily unique.
Proof: Theorem 9 follows from lemmas 3 and 4.

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3.3 Strategic Optimal investment equilibria
Given production costs (c1, c2) ∈ [0, α1] × [0, α2], the strategic optimal investment
equilibria (Nash equilibria) (v1, v2) ∈ R+0 × R+0 are the solutions of the system:{
v1 = V1(v2; c1, c2)
v2 = V2(v1; c1, c2)
,
where V1 and V2 are the strategic optimal investment response functions computed
in the previous section. Let N(c1, c2) be the set of all strategic optimal investment
equilibrium for production costs (c1, c2).
We find, at most, three distinct types of strategic optimal investment equilibria (v1, v2):
(i) a competitive Nash equilibrium where both firms invest, see d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), i.e. v1 > 0 and v2 > 0; (ii) a single Nash equilibrium of firm
F1 where firm F1 invests and firm F2 does not, i.e. v1 > 0 and v2 = 0; (iii) a single
Nash equilibrium of firm F2 where firm F2 invests and firm F1 does not, i.e. v2 > 0 and
v1 = 0. We define a competitive investment region C consisting of strategic optimal
investment equilibria where both firms invest, a single investment region S1 for firm
F1, consisting of strategic optimal investment equilibria where just firm F1 invests and
a single investment region S2 for firm F2, consisting of strategic optimal investment
equilibria where just firm F2 invests. We say that a firm Fj is out of the market if the
output level qj is zero.
Lemma 6. Suppose that firm Fi uses a patent. The single Nash equilibrium of firm Fi
in the single region Si drives the other firm Fj out of the market. Furthermore,
vi = min
{(
λi(αi − ci)
4βi − λ2i
)2
,
(
ci
λi
)2}
is the Nash investment equilibrium of Firm Fi.
Proof: If the Firm Fj is not out of the market then its profit increases if the firm
invests because ∂aj/∂vj(0) = +∞. Then by Lemma 3 we obtain that vi is the Nash
investment equilibrium of Firm Fi.

In the example discussed in Figure 3.3, we observe that intersection S1 ∩ S2 between
the region S1 and the region S2 is non-empty, i.e. the strategic optimal investment
equilibrium is not unique.
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Figure 3.3: Full characterization of the strategic optimal investment regions in terms
of the firms’ initial production costs (c1, c2). The single investment regions S1 and S2
are shown in blue and red, respectively. The intersection S1∩S2 between region S1 and
region S2 is shown in pink. The competitive investment region C is shown in green.
In the example discussed in Figure 3.4, we observe that the firms choose higher values
of strategic optimal investments when the production costs take intermediate values.
Furthermore, there are a discontinuities in the strategic optimal investments and in
the profit function.
3.4 Discrete R&D dynamics
The (myopic optimal) discrete R&D dynamics
(c1(n+ 1), c2(n+ 1)) = (g1(c1(n), c2(n)), g2(c1(n), c2(n)))
are defined as follows: given a pair of production costs (c1(n), c2(n)), at time n, each
strategic optimal investment equilibrium (v1(n), v2(n)) ∈ N(c1(n), c2(n)) determines a
new pair of production costs
(c1(n+ 1), c2(n+ 1)) = (a1(v1(n), v2(n)), a2(v1(n), v2(n))),
at time n + 1. The discrete R&D dynamics in the production costs (c1(n), c2(n)),
determines discrete R&D dynamics in the strategic optimal investment equilibrium
(v1(n), v2(n)) and in the profits (π1(n), π2(n)) of the firms.
We observe that the map from the production costs at time n to the production costs
at time n+1 is multi-valued when N(c1(n), c2(n)) is not a singleton. However, we can
restrict the analysis separately to (i) the competitive Nash equilibrium in the Duopoly
region D; (ii) to the single Nash equilibrium of firm F1 in the single region S1; and (iii)
to the single Nash equilibrium of firm F2 in the single region S2.
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL INVESTMENTS IN COURNOT COMPETITION 64
A B
Figure 3.4: 3-D Plots for firm F1 in terms of the firms’ initial production costs
(c1, c2). Green corresponds to pairs of production costs (c1, c2) in the competitive
investment region C; Yellow corresponds to pairs of production costs (c1, c2) in the
single investment region S1; Light blue corresponds to pairs of production costs (c1, c2)
in the single investment region S2. (A) Firms’ strategic optimal investments; (B)
Firms’ profits.
Lemma 7. Suppose that firm Fi uses a patent and it has initial production cost ci(1).
In single Nash equilibrium of firm Fi the production cost ci(n+ 1) is given by:
ci(n+ 1) = max
{
0, ci(n)− λi
∣∣∣∣λi(αi − ci)4βi − λ2i
∣∣∣∣
}
.
Proof: It follows from applying Lemma 6 to the new production cost ai(vi, vj).

Hence, by Lemma 7, in the intersection S1 ∩ S2 of the regions S1 and S2 depending on
which of the two single Nash equilibria is chosen, the firms will achieve two opposite
economic outputs: the firm that does not invest gets out of the market and the other
firm reduces to zero its production costs in a finite time.
In Figure 3.5, the arrows indicate the evolution under the R&D discrete dynamics for
example in the Section above.
3.5 Continuous R&D dynamics
The (myopic optimal) continuous R&D dynamics on the investments (v1(t), v2(t))
consists of each firm choosing its marginal rate of investment proportional to the
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Figure 3.5: Dynamics on the production costs (c1, c2): in blue, the dynamics in the
single Nash investment region S1; in red the dynamics in the single Nash investment
region S2; and in green the dynamics in the competitive Nash investment region C.
marginal rate of the profit with respect to its investment{
dv1
dt
= Γ1
∂π1(c1,c2,v1,v2)
∂v1
dv2
dt
= Γ2
∂π2(c1,c2,v1,v2)
∂v2
.
The continuous R&D dynamics in the investments (v1(t), v2(t)) determines continuous
R&D dynamics in the production costs (c1(t), c2(t)) and in the profits (π1(t), π2(t)) of
the firms.
The multi-valued indeterminacy in the discrete R&D dynamics is resolved in the
continuous R&D dynamics by knowing the initial investments of both firms.
In the example illustrated in Figures 3.6(A) and 3.6(B) we observe, for some high initial
production costs, that there are close enough initial conditions (v1, v2) and (w1, w2)
whose dynamical evolutions are economically quite distinct: (i) for the initial condition
(v1, v2) the trajectory of the production costs of both firms F1 and F2 go to 0; (ii) for the
initial condition (w1, w2) the trajectory of the production costs of firm F1 goes to zero
and the firm F2 goes out of the market. Furthermore, the discrete R&D dynamics can
be quite different from the continuous R&D dynamics because for the high production
costs considered there is no competitive Nash equilibrium and so case (i) does not occur
in the case of discrete R&D dynamics.
3.6 Conclusions
We presented deterministic and stochastic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot
competitions, based on perfect Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies of the
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Figure 3.6: Continuous R&D dynamics on the investments. (A) Starting at an
strategic optimal investment (v1, v2); (B) Slightly changing the previous strategic
optimal investment to (w1, w2).
firms at every period of the game. The following conclusions are valid in some pa-
rameter regions of our model of Cournot competition for firms with different values of
the maximum percentage of reduction of the production costs. The model presented a
unique perfect Nash equilibrium, except for initial costs far away from the minimum
attainable reduced production costs where the uniqueness of the equilibrium is broken.
We characterized the effect of the production costs on the perfect Nash investment
equilibria and on the corresponding profits. We described three main economic regions
corresponding to drastically distinct, long term, behaviours for the firms along the time:
the no survival, weak survival and recovery regions. The boundaries of these regions are
described using the stable manifolds of well characterized fixed points showing a nice
interplay between dynamical systems, game theory and industrial organization. We
illustrated the transients and the asymptotic limits of the deterministic dynamics on
the production costs of the duopoly competition. The firm with better R&D program
can start with initial higher production costs and recover along the time to be the
firm with lower production costs after some periods of time. We have shown drastic
long term economic effects resulting from small changes of the maximum percentage
of reduction of the production costs of the R&D investment programs, and from small
changes of the initial costs of the firms. We observe, for given initial costs for both
firms, that the presence of uncertainty in the model allows the firms to have opposite
outcomes with positive probability: (i) for some fixed parameter values of the model,
with positive probability, the firm F1 is driven out of the market or, with positive
probability, is able to recover; (ii) for some fixed parameter values of the model, with
positive probability, the firm F1 gets out of the market or, with positive probability,
firm F2 is driven out of the market. We observe that the profits of the firms determined
by the deterministic dynamics have values significantly lower than the mean values of
the profits obtained in the stochastic simulations due to the non-linear effects.
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